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German Council on Foreign Relations
Upgrading Europe’s 
Civilian Crisis  
Management
A Strategic Planning Process  
in Ten Steps
The European Union sees civilian CSDP missions as a hallmark 
of its foreign policy. But these missions are implemented ad hoc, 
without any kind of systematic or strategic planning. As a result, 
the EU does not have the right capabilities to address essential 
challenges. Capability-based planning organized into a ten-step 
process offers a much better way. Existing EU initiatives can be 
used to kick-start a new approach. 
 – The way the EU and its member states define, plan, and gener-
ate capabilities for civilian crisis missions is highly ineffective 
and inefficient. As a result, Europe is frequently unable to imple-
ment political objectives.
 – Introducing capability-based planning offers many benefits: 
Based on the EU’s Global Strategy, it would combine foresight 
exercises with a tangible and realistic level of ambition. 
 – A robust ten-step planning process can be used to kick-start 
this new approach to civilian capability planning. EU initiatives 
like the Strategic Compass can play an enabling role. 
 – The EU could highlight this new start by calling it the Feira II 
initiative. This would be a highly symbolic reference to the Por-
tuguese city of Feira, where the EU in 2000 first agreed headline 
goals for its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
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THE CHANGING SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND SIDES OF SECURITY
If the EU is serious about playing a significant role 
in international security and protecting its citizens 
from newly emerging threats, it needs to dramat-
ically increase its efforts in civilian crisis manage-
ment. Giving European crisis management more 
clout means boosting the supply side to meet the in-
creased demand for security.
Demand Side: A Deteriorating Security  
Environment
Europe’s security environment has changed dramat-
ically. Since the Arab spring of 2011, an arc of crises 
has developed outside the EU’s borders, stretching 
from Northern and Central Africa to the Middle East 
and further to Ukraine. As a result of growing inter-
national tensions, the EU faces cyber-attacks and 
acts of terrorism, which sometimes even originate 
from within its own borders. The security within the 
Union is significantly influenced by the security out-
side the Union.1 But the danger is not just one of in-
stability and violence spilling over into the EU. Core 
values of the EU – which is committed to the rule of 
law and to open and democratic societies which re-
spect individual rights and responsibilities – are be-
ing openly and violently challenged.
Supply Side: Member States Remain Ambivalent
When EU member states decided to develop a com-
mon foreign and security policy (CFSP) in 1993, one 
key motivation was to make a significant contribu-
tion to international security. Civilian crisis manage-
ment (CCM), using instruments such as mediation, 
policing, and support for political reforms, is a hall-
mark of an active European foreign policy. 
Beginning with the Global Strategy of 2016, the EU 
discourse has focused on the concept of strategic au-
tonomy. While this entails a wide scope of definitions, 
a sufficient capacity to manage the most urgent cri-
ses clearly is key. The current level of EU engagement 
does not reflect the political level of ambition. 
Missions for the EU’s Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP) largely depend on the member states 
for their implementation and effectiveness as they 
own the bulk of all capabilities. On paper, the EU and 
its member states are committed to strategic aims 
1  See also: Hannah Neumann, Carina Böttcher, Christian Mölling, Marie Wolf: “EU Civilian Crisis Management: How the Union Can Live up to Its Ambitions – 
or Stumble into Irrelevance”, DGAPkompakt No. 15, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) (July 2018).
2  Council of the European Union,“Council Conclusions on Civilian CSDP Compact”, Outcome of Proceedings, 7.12.2020, 13571/20:  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47185/st13571-en20.pdf (accessed December 15, 2020)
which call for more and more effective capabilities. 
But this is matched neither by the current level of 
engagement in missions nor by the rhetorical level 
of ambition. As a result, it is unclear which crises the 
EU is able and willing to deal with. 
If the EU truly wishes to deliver security, it needs to 
concentrate on those crises that pose serious risks 
to Europe and plan for a possible response in terms 
of quality and quantity. The Strategic Compass (SC) 
process is a first step in that direction, as the EU 
Council confirmed in its recent conclusions on the 
Civilian CSDP Compact.2 
More generally, the EU needs to focus on the threats 
it will have to respond to in the future. Without a co-
herent and forward-looking EU approach, member 
states can neither decide on their ambitions nor de-
termine the capabilities and equipment needed to 
live up to those ambitions.
THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC 
CAPABILITY PLANNING 
Current Shortfalls in Capability Planning
For the success of CSDP, capabilities play a crucial 
role. This is true not just for military missions but al-
so for civilian crisis management. Capabilities should 
be defined in accordance with the EU’s strategic ob-
jectives and the challenges on the ground. A clear 
analysis is needed to provide instruments that can 
support the implementation of EU policy objectives. 
To this end, the EU first needs to assess future 
challenges in terms of crisis as well as crisis man-
agement. Second, it must define its level of ambi-
tion: Which types of conflict or crisis should the EU 
respond to, and what are the goals of those missions 
in terms of protecting European interests and values?
WHAT IS A CAPABILITY? 
Capability refers to the ability to implement a 
given task. In concrete terms, a capability relies 
on skilled professionals who operate under a 
common goal within an organizational frame and 
who are supported by material resources such as 
equipment, IT infrastructure, or logistics.
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However, the EU currently operates on an entirely 
different basis. It tends to design CCM missions by 
what is ad hoc available. There is no systematic eval-
uation of what may be needed for future missions. As 
a result, missions are defined more by what capabili-
ties are available than by what may be needed. 
Planning for the Past or the Future? 
Anticipating future changes in the security envi-
ronment is key to ensuring that CCM missions will 
achieve their strategic objectives. Any plan based on 
today’s parameters will be outdated by the time it is 
implemented. It takes years to generate special ca-
pabilities or even to expand existing ones. Fielding a 
capability can easily take six to eight years from tak-
ing the decision to budgeting, generating, and train-
ing. Over this stretch of time, the parameters are 
certain to have changed. 
What is needed, then, is a more systematic planning 
process based on a forward-looking capability profile 
which allows for gap analysis and sets priorities for 
capability generation. Such a systematic approach 
also brings an additional benefit: It creates a power-
ful tool for national budget negotiations as it shows 
exactly what each EU member state needs to do to 
contribute a fair share to the EU’s missions. It thus 
legitimizes spending on civilian capabilities.
There is nothing revolutionary about capabili-
ty-based approaches. They are widely employed in 
areas such as public administration and business3, 
and they have even been used in civilian CSDP be-
fore. The so-called Feira headline goal, the very first 
CCM capability goals set by the EU, were qualified 
and quantified according to a capability-based ap-
proach. Naturally, this undertaking would be most 
fruitful if embedded in an overall reconfiguration of 
the EU`s comprehensive approach to prevention, cri-
sis management, and stabilization while including 
the civilian developments.
THE EU’S CURRENT APPROACH 
TO CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES 
Three mutually reinforcing def icits mark the 
current approach to civilian capabilities: 
3 Strategic capability planning is a standard in many areas, for example public administration, business and the military. For example: Strategic 
Management in Public Administration, John Bryson and Bert George, in: The Oxford Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Oxford University Press, January 
2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337472823_Strategic_Management_in_Public_Administration (accessed December 15, 2020); Zahra, 
Shaker A. and Sapienza, Harry J. and Davidsson, Per (2006) Entrepreneurship and Dynamic Capabilities: A Review, Model and Research Agenda. Journal of 
Management Studies 43(4):pp. 917-955, https://eprints.qut.edu.au/5850/1/5850a.pdf (accessed December 15, 2020).
4 For suggestions on the concrete topics to be addressed, see: Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz, “The EU’s Strategic Compass and Its Four Baskets 
Recommendations to Make the Most of It”, DGAP Report No. 13, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) (November 2020).
• There is no effective strategic guidance to inform 
planning and match capabilities to strategic 
objectives. 
• There is also no systematic capability planning 
process to translate the strategic guidance into 
capability generation. Instead, capability demand is 
largely shaped by individual missions.
• The existing civilian capability profile mostly rep-
resents a terra incognita: Neither the EU nor its 
member states have a clear overview of the quality 
and quantity of EU’s civilian capabilities – neither in 
term of demand nor of supply. 
Lack of an Effective Strategic Guidance
While the EU and its member states have drawn up 
crisis management strategies and developed some 
elements of long-term conflict assessment and hori-
zon scanning, these do not inform capability plan-
ning in any systematic way. It is the past which 
guides EU civilian capabilities. The only exception is 
the Feira headline goal agreed back in the year 2000. 
Even though the reality of missions has changed sig-
nificantly since then, the Feira goal remains a central 
point of reference in debates about improving capa-
bilities, especially regarding the SC.4 But even then, 
member states have not permanently made the ca-
pabilities available that they agreed to in Feira.
No Systematic Capability Planning
Currently, Europe relies on mission-based plan-
ning, meaning that every mission is dealt with in-
dividually. It is only in the run-up to a mission that 
the EU begins to think about the capabilities need-
ed. The closer the starting date of the mission ap-
proaches, the more institutions (e.g. the Political and 
Security Committee, the Crisis Management Plan-
ning Directorate, etc.) and planning instruments 
(Crisis Management Concept, Operations Plan, etc.) 
get involved. They sketch out the individual, mis-
sion-based capability needs. 
There is no systematic capability planning process 
that would assess capability needs beyond current or 
past missions. Moreover, at this pre-mission stage, 
the time pressure to begin the engagement is high. 
The focus is most probably not on capability gaps 
and how to close them for future missions, especially 
not as there are no relevant procedures for translat-
Upgrading Europe’s Civilian Crisis Management
4
POLICY BRIEF
No. 28 | December 2020
ing such information into capability planning. Rarely 
do new impulses make the capability profile evolve.
Past experiences shape capabilities not just because 
of the focus on individual missions and the experi-
ences resulting from them but also due to institu-
tional path dependencies. People who are proud of 
having developed and found support for the existing 
approach find change difficult. 
However, when drivers mainly look at the rear-view 
mirror, they become unable to account for chang-
es during an operation (medium-term perspective) 
or the challenges of future conflicts (long-term per-
spective). Yet most missions are of long duration, and 
mission environments – what or who fuels the con-
flict that the mission is meant to address – change. 
The EU and its members states need to understand 
that such change will continue. Future missions will 
demand capabilities that are quantitively and qual-
itatively different from what is needed today. They 
cannot be identified through the current approach.
Missing Taxonomy and Inventory of Capabilities 
The European Union and its member states have lit-
tle information about the quality and quantity of ex-
isting CCM capabilities. This also means that it is 
difficult for national governments to justify the de-
mand for additional capabilities in their domestic 
budget negotiations. In most cases, they cannot ar-
gue that what they ask for represents a fair share of 
the burden and is necessary because of the strategic 
importance of the instrument.
Gaps remain unknown
As there is no systematic inventory of capabilities, 
it is impossible to know to what extent the EU and 
its member states are currently implementing a giv-
en headline goal. Assessing the existing missions and 
the personnel pools which exist in some member 
states only gives a very raw indication of what might 
be available. As a consequence, gaps can neither be 
measured nor eliminated. 
No standard definitions 
The EU also lacks a taxonomy of CCM capabilities 
which could serve as a foundation for planning pro-
cesses. There is no agreement on how to define and 
monitor capabilities and how to operationalize the 
level of ambition, i.e. what is needed when at what 
quality and quantity. 
Fragmentation across nations
With an EU guidance based on a common capability 
planning process, planning at the national level tends 
to be shaped by domestic dynamics. From an EU per-
spective, it becomes fragmented, inconsistent, and 
incoherent. Also, capabilities needed for CCM are gen-
erally developed for domestic functions. It is only lat-
er and on an ad hoc basis that they get repurposed for 
the EU’s civilian crisis management missions.
A few member states (e.g. Germany, Sweden, Lat-
via) have started to keep a register of professionals 
with particular skills to be better prepared for calls 
for contributions. But these registers do not include 
more unorthodox skill sets, and there is little or no 
coordination between those member states.
A CAPABILITY-BASED APPROACH: 
GETTING AHEAD OF THE CURVE
A capability-based approach can help address all 
three shortfalls of the current system: It can provide 
strategic level guidance, a forward-looking and time-
ly planning process, and a taxonomy and inventory 
for monitoring capabilities. Such an approach is rou-
tine in other areas of politics and resource or capac-
ity development. But it still requires political support 
from the member states. 
Elements of a capability-based approach
A capability-based approach will operate unter the as-
sumption that actors must prepare capabilities well in 
advance to ensure quality and readiness. As it is im-
possible to know the exact nature of the next mission, 
actors have to prepare for a spectrum of possible sce-
narios. The resulting capability profile will not be per-
fect for any one scenario, but it will deliver satisfactory 
results across the entire spectrum. 
Capability based planning needs to consider three 
elements: 
• Conflict trends can be used to define the known ele-
ments of any future security environment. The EU 
needs to prepare for them under any circumstances. 
• An analysis of the uncertainties in future conflicts 
can help to shed light on contingencies that might 
otherwise catch the EU unprepared.
• Lessons learnt from past missions and their appli-
cability to current and future capability planning 
should be considered in order to develop standard 
capabilities and routines.
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The EU and its member states will need to provide 
political guidance on the goals of future engage-
ments. Planning tools can then help to define the 
required capabilities as well as the time frame and 
investment involved. They can also provide feedback 
if the desired level of ambition is not achievable. 
In addition, any use of CCM tools needs to be assessed 
in comparison to the many other instruments the EU 
and its member states have available. For example, 
the EU delegation in Kosovo has implemented rule of 
law projects funded and staffed by the Commission. 
Though CSDP capabilities are to be made available by 
member states through secondment, this need not ex-
clude cooptation on the ground. Different combina-
tions and scenarios should be examined to find out 
where capabilities overlap. Thus, potential choices on 
capabilities and instruments can be identified. Similar-
ly, factoring in potential contributions by partners like 
the United Nations or individual countries such as the 
UK or Norway allows to test many variations and offer 
more sophisticated scenarios.
Naturally, past practices and experiences will remain 
relevant to some extent. But to avoid preparing for 
the past, i.e. allowing past experiences to rule fu-
ture capabilities, it is essential to use scientific fore-
sight methods to explore scenarios for the future. It 
is possible to anticipate many elements which will be 
important to the definition of future missions and 
their environment. Strategic foresight exercises can 
transform some aspects of an unknown future into 
known contingencies. For these conflict contingen-
cies, hypothetical missions can then be planned. 
A better understanding of known trends as well as 
what remains unknowable will help actors to meet the 
challenges of tomorrow: Which issues are likely to oc-
cur, which developments may turn out to be particu-
larly disruptive, and which capabilities are needed to 
address the situation? Moreover, with this approach, a 
larger variety of mission objectives and their impact on 
the need for capabilities can be analyzed. 
Finally, a systematic process of capability develop-
ment, which stretches into the future and brings 
together several countries, will need to define cate-
gories and benchmarks for capabilities. This will al-
low the EU to draw up an inventory of capabilities 
already available. Once this capability profile exists, 
gaps as well as superfluous resources can be easily 
identified. Member states can then plan how to ad-
dress such inefficiencies. 
THE TEN STEPS OF A CAPABILITY 
PLANNING CYCLE 
Future CCM planning could be based on a process 
following the following ten steps: 
1 Explain the EU’s conflict strategy: How, why, and when does the EU need to engage in conflict?
2 Explain the role of civilian crisis management and CSDP in that conflict strategy as well as the 
link to other instruments: Among the different in-
struments, what value can civilian CSDP add?
3 Define the level of ambition in crisis manage-ment and stabilization: What does the EU want 
to be able to do and to achieve? 
4 Analyze the challenges posed by future crises and subsequent mission environments by using 
scenario-based planning: What do missions need to 
be equipped for?
5 Define the missions the EU wishes to engage in: Is the EU‘s committed to the full range of mis-
sions, or would it prefer to specialize on particular 
aspects, possibly cooperating with other actors (e.g. 
UN, UK) when needed?
6 Develop the EU capability profile: Which tasks and resulting capabilities are needed for these 
missions, both quantitatively and qualitatively?
7 Assess the baseline: Which capabilities are avail-able today? 
8 Estimate capability gaps and excess capabilities today and in ten years’ time: Which capabilities 
need to be developed and expanded, both quantita-
tively and qualitatively? Which will not be needed?
9 Define priority areas for capability development and sustainment, areas of cooperation, special-
ization, and division of labor between member states: 
Who will contribute and sustain which capabilities?
10 Compare the result with the resources avail-able, revisit steps 1 to 3 regularly, and adapt 
aims and means accordingly: How does the EU’s ca-
pability plan need to be amended to keep strate-
gic planning in line with current and anticipated 
challenges?
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More realistically, this procedure should be seen 
as a cycle. New impulses come in at different entry 
points, especially at steps 1 to 3. The cycle also con-
tains routine elements like 8 and 9, and there can be 
changes in sequence among steps 1 to 5. 
This approach would need to be established in an 
iterative process to synchronize the three core el-
ements: strategic level guidance, the planning pro-
cess, and finally the taxonomy and inventory for 
monitoring capabilities.
TOWARD A CIVILIAN 
CAPABILITY PROFILE
When reforming its civilian capability planning, the 
EU can avoid mistakes made in other areas, especial-
ly the military. It is an advantage that little structure 
exists so far – the landscape can be built up from 
nearly nothing in accordance with the underlying re-
quirements. This avoids the slow evolution of a mix 
of institutions that overlap in competencies and fre-
quently miscommunicate. 
In general, forward-looking planning must not end 
up turning projections into self-fulfilling prophe-
cies. Threats and crisis environments undergo con-
stant change. Therefore, planning needs to include a 
continuous assessment of present and future needs 
of missions in order to prepare efficiently and effec-
tively. The goal is to be ready for a large bandwidth 
of  crises.
Set Up Appropriate Institutions 
Capability planning needs to be anchored in appro-
priate institutions. Initially, a civil capability plan-
ning cell will do, but its tasks should eventually be 
transferred into a HQ level entity which can deliv-
er capability planning, mission planning, and mis-
sion command and control as a one stop shop. This 
should be separate but not isolated from its military 
counterpart.
The institutions involved will need to put a massive 
effort into compiling the lessons learnt from mis-
sions, developing foresight sessions and scenari-
os, and drawing up a baseline capability assessment. 
These efforts need to be complemented by process-
es at the national level. 
Depending on the political level of ambition, the 
structures need to encourage more interaction with 
other European and national institutions. Civilian 
CSDP represents only one component of an inte-
grated approach and therefore should not be isolat-
ed from other efforts to improve the EU’s capacity 
to act.
Build a Culture of Ownership 
The process leading to the civilian CSDP Compact 
can serve as a model for the first steps toward cre-
ating a civilian capability profile. The Compact start-
ed out with an organized dialogue with stakeholders 
to hear their suggestions for improving the cur-
rent system. A similar effort here could help to in-
crease awareness and ownership of civilian CSDP as 
an instrument.
Furthermore, the so-called mini concepts have a 
forward-loooking impetus. As part of the Compact’s 
operationalization, they explore what CCM can po-
tentially contribute to addressing security challeng-
es such as improving cyber security or preventing 
and countering violent extremism. It is a promising 
endeavour to assess the prospective possibilities of 
civilian missions that have been strengthened in ac-
cordance with the Compact. However, efforts should 
not be limited to possible new areas but regularly 
reevaluate existing ones, too, as change is constant. 
To build a culture of ownership and to spread aware-
ness of the logic of capability planning to national 
and EU institutions, some of the HQ posts could be 
staffed by member state officials who would eventu-
ally rotate back into national positions for civilian ca-
pability planning. Other posts should be staffed by 
EU institutions and possibly later on by partners like 
the UN or the African Union.  
Make Use of the Strategic Compass 
The Strategic Compass process is designed to produce 
political agreement on an up-to-date level of ambition. 
At the same time, it provides an interpretation of the 
EU Global Strategy, which can be used for Step 1 of the 
planning process. In a next stage, the SC can be used 
to give indications or even answers for steps 2 to 5. It 
also includes a forward-looking threat analysis.
The SC was primarily set up to deliver inputs to mili-
tary capability planning. However, from the perspec-
tive of the EU’s integrated approach, it makes sense 
to use the SC for civilian capability planning as well. 
In the best case, civilian planning would be added 
an explicit goal to the Strategic Dialogue, which has 
been initiated as part of the SC. 
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Move Toward a Feira II 
Symbols are important. If the European Union intro-
duces a civilian capability planning mechanism based 
on the SC, the process could be kicked off in the Por-
tuguese city of Feira where in 2000, the first CSDP 
headline goals were agreed. A Feira II proposal could 
be agreed during the Portuguese EU presidency in 
2021. This – and a robust plan to quickly initiate the 
capability planning process – could put civilian CSDP 
back on the strategic agenda. 
Three other innovations should also become part of 
such a Feira II agreement. First, the progress made 
on the Compact process should be consolidated. 
Second, the link between the Compact and capa-
bility planning needs to be defined and spelled out 
in detail. Third, the EU should revamp its compre-
hensive approach to prevention, crisis management, 
and stabilization while including the civilian develop-
ments. Civilian crisis management, in addition to the 
existing military tools and instruments of the Com-
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